Abstract: This is a review essay, based on a critical assessment of The Ant Trap by Brian Epstein. Epstein argues that models in the social sciences are inadequate because they are based on a false ontology of methodological individualism, and proposes a new model of social ontology. I examine this model and point to flaws in it. More generally, I argue against Epstein's methodological approach, which treats social ontology as prior to social scientific modelling and as certifying the 'building blocks' that modellers then use. I argue that modellers can legitimately shape the building blocks for their own models.
Brian Epstein has written a book with a mysterious title, The Ant Trap, and an ambitious subtitle, Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences. It is a work of ontology, the branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of being. More specifically, it is a contribution to social ontology. At the core of the agenda of social ontology, as understood by Epstein, is the question that he sets out to answer: 'What are social facts, social objects, and social phenomena -these things that the social sciences aim to model and explain?' (7). Many economists will suppose that such an abstruse question has little relevance for their work, however legitimate a concern it may be for philosophers. But Epstein argues that social ontology should be the foundation of the social sciences: 'getting the ontology right' is an essential precondition for sound modelling (278) . And that requires the 'sophisticated toolkit of metaphysics' that social ontologists have at their disposal (9).
Epstein is in no doubt that the social sciences in general, and economics in particular,
have not got the ontology right, and that, as a consequence of this, their models are inadequate. The Introduction of the book begins with a statement of what Epstein calls 'the Paradox of the Social Sciences'. The supposed paradox is that, over the last twenty years, there has been an explosive growth in the collection of data about people, and so there ought to have been a corresponding improvement in the ability of social scientists to resolve questions about such things as 'the workings of the economy, the sources of poverty, the prescriptions for improving education, and financial regulation'; but in fact the social sciences 'are hardly budging'. The usual clichés about the failure of economists to predict the 2008 crash are rehearsed; the pre-crash optimism of the usual suspects (Ben Bernanke, Oliver Blanchard) is mocked; Paul Krugman's New York Times column is cited in evidence (1-4). After three pages of such commonplaces, Epstein takes the 'failures of social science' to be a matter of established fact. He then tells us that he thinks these failures result from modelling that has been built on unsound ontological foundations. Hence the need to rebuild the foundations of the social sciences.
Where do the ants come in? Epstein's diagnosis of the failures of social science is that the practice of social science rests on a particular analogy between the social and natural sciences. That analogy is that 'that the objects of the social sciences are built out of individual people much as an ant colony is built out of ants'. But this analogy is flawed:
We often think of social facts as depending on people, as being created by people, as the actions of people. We think of them as products of the mental processes, intentions, beliefs, habits, and practices of individual people. But none of this is quite right […] My aim in this book is […] to demonstrate that philosophers and social scientists have an overly anthropocentric picture of the social world. [The social world] turns out to be not nearly as people-centred as is widely assumed. (7) The 'ant trap' is the supposed error of building social science on individualistic foundations.
Epstein presents a critique of methodological individualism and proposes a new account of the nature of social facts. Given Epstein's opening remarks about the failures of social science and his diagnosis of these failures as the result of bad ontology, one might have expected his book to contain some serious discussion of the theories that social scientists actually use. One might have expected to be shown what ontological assumptions are built into these theories, how those assumptions are false, and how theory could be improved by using the ontology that Epstein proposes. In fact, there is almost nothing about any of this. Two major branches of social science theory -game theory and the theory of public choice (or, as it is now sometimes called, political economy) -seem particularly relevant to the kinds of 'social facts' that Epstein discusses, and by implication to be targets of his criticisms. Game theory appears only in a one-sentence footnote, which it has to share with general equilibrium theory (20, note 10). There are occasional brief citations of specific models from public choice theory, but no sustained discussion of the modelling strategy they embody. Nor, incidentally, is there any discussion of how biologists model the behaviour of social animals, and so the claim that the 'ant trap' is a false analogy between social and natural science remains an unsupported assertion.
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It is hard to know what to make of these huge gaps in Epstein's argument. The idea that the failures of economics are so obvious as not to need to be demonstrated, and the conviction that these failures can be remedied by abstract philosophical reasoning which takes no notice of existing theory or evidence, express a breathtaking disdain for two hundred and fifty years of work in the discipline. It is perhaps significant that, in Epstein's ontology, facts about human society are fundamentally different from those investigated by the natural sciences -including facts about non-human social animals. This (one might think anthropocentric) distinction allows Epstein to avoid discussing the implications of his method 1 In modelling the behaviour of animals that live in colonies, as ants do, biologists need to be able to track the continuing properties of colonies across generations. One might have thought that such group-level properties might fail to supervene on properties of the individual members of a colony in much the same way that, according to Epstein, supervenience fails for legislatures (see Section 2 below). of analysis for the natural sciences. But if he is right about the social sciences, ontologists can correct failures in the theories of the natural sciences too, without actually examining them.
As will be clear by now, I found Epstein's discussion of economics unhelpful. But in the remainder of this essay I will overlook the hyperbole of his Introduction. It seems to be intrinsic to Epstein's understanding of the role of social ontology that it discovers the 'building blocks' from which social reality is made, and that good modelling works with these blocks (9, 60). Modellers should not be making their own building blocks; they should be using what is already there. If this is right, ontologists can contribute to modelling without knowing anything about models. I propose to read The Ant Trap as an attempt to discover the nature of social reality, and to consider what economists can learn from it. I will begin by considering Epstein's critique of methodological individualism.
Methodological individualism
Epstein finds the clearest statement of the principle of methodological individualism in the work of the philosopher John W. N. Watkins, a student of Karl Popper. For example:
Now if social events like inflation, political revolution, 'the disappearance of the middle classes', etc., are brought about by people, then they must be explained in terms of people: in terms of the situations people confront and the ambitions, fears and ideas which activate them. In short, large-scale social phenomena must be accounted for by the situations, dispositions and beliefs of individuals. This I call methodological individualism. (Watkins, 1955: 58) . In cases like these, it is clearly a legitimate scientific aspiration to try to derive higher-level properties from lower-level ones -to 'reduce' the former to the latter. But that is not to say that there is anything wrong with using higher-level properties, such as angles of repose for 
Supervenience
In philosophical analyses, the intuitive idea of 'nothing over and above' is usually represented by the concept of supervenience. Epstein offers the following definition, where A is a set of higher-level properties and B is a set of lower-level properties: 'To say A supervenes on B … is to say an object cannot change its A-properties without there being some accompanying change in its B-properties' (33). For example, a scree slope cannot change its gradient without there being some accompanying change in the properties and positions of individual rocks. Ontological individualism, as construed by Epstein, is the view that 'social facts' supervene on 'individualistic facts'. Epstein argues that this view is false (36).
The difficulty here is that, although supervenience is a well-defined concept, 'social fact' and 'individualistic fact' are imprecise concepts with a wide range of disparate applications. It is one thing to say of a specific social science model that its social properties do or do not supervene on its individualistic properties. Thus, for example, a model of public choice might describe a process of pairwise majority voting, and define a concept of 'social preference' in terms of the outcome of this process. In this case, it would clearly be correct to say that, in the model, social preferences supervene on individuals' voting behaviour. But it is another thing to say that, in the real world, the set of all social properties supervenes on the set of all individualistic properties. That assertion seems insufficiently precise to be judged either clearly true or clearly false.
In fairness to Epstein, it must be said that he cites some distinguished scholars who seem to make such claims. For example, Lukes's set of 'banal propositions' includes:
Society consists of people. Groups consist of people. Institutions consist of people plus rules and roles. Rules are followed (or not followed) by people and roles are filled by people. (1968: 120) In relation to the attribution of agency to groups, Christian List and Philip Pettit (2011: 64) say:
The things a group agent does are clearly determined by the things its members do; they cannot emerge independently. In particular, no group agent can form intentional attitudes without these being determined, in one way or another, by certain contributions of its members, and no group agent can act without one or more of its members acting.
I am not sure that it makes sense to try to show that statements like these are false, rather than merely sententious and imprecise. Nevertheless, it is useful to know what happens if one tries to take ontological individualism at face value. This is what Epstein does in (as he puts it) 'debunking' and 'putting to bed' the claims of ontological individualism (129, 203) . Although some of the arguments he deploys for this purpose make use of the sophisticated metaphysical toolkit he has told us about, he also uses common-sense arguments which, to my mind, work just as well.
One of his opening examples, intended only to aid intuition, is a question about Starbucks Corporation: Are facts about Starbucks exhaustively determined by facts about its shareholders and its employees? The obvious answer is that they are not:
To be sure, the employees are critical to the operation of Starbucks. But facts about Starbucks seem also to depend on facts about the coffee, the espresso machines, the business license, and the accounting ledgers. (46) At first sight, this argument might seem to miss the point. Of course, a critic might say, Starbucks would not work without its espresso machines, but it is only the employees who perform actions with those machines. But Epstein can reply that an action is only a special kind of operation, and the machines perform operations too. The production of an espresso involves an interaction between the operations of a barista and the operations of an espresso machine. If we are drawing up a list of the lower-level properties on which the higher-level properties of Starbucks supervene, what grounds are there for excluding properties of the machines?
Another example, which Epstein works through in more detail, is an elected legislature (229-233). The legislature is a social entity with an identity that continues over time, even though its membership changes. Since it takes decisions, we can treat it as an agent.
2 Are facts about its decisions exhaustively determined by facts about its members?
One obvious reason for answering 'No' is that the collective decisions of a legislature are on the actions of group members. That allows us to understand that particular kinds of groups (legislatures being an example) can be set up to achieve particular purposes, and that thousands of years of sociality have endowed human beings with strategies for 'improving the design of groups, helping to ensure that they accomplish their purposes' (234-235). In the case of a legislature, the factors that can be manipulated include its rules for aggregating votes and the rules by which its members are elected. Of course, Epstein is right about this.
But if these are new ideas for social ontology, they are not new for social science. They have been at the core of the agenda of public choice since the work of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962 Such a formula is a constitutive rule. 'Counting as' is understood as the collective recognition, acceptance and acknowledgement of that status within some society. In Searle's central example, X is a U.S. dollar bill, described as a material object, Y is the status 'money', understood as a medium of exchange, and C is 'the United States' (Searle, 1995: 40, 43-51 4 The other kind, exemplified by properties of a dollar bill, is the focus of the Standard Model (56-57). Epstein seems to be looking for a unified account of the ontology of everything that could possibly be called a 'social fact'; an analysis of a particular type of social fact, however well-defined, is not good enough. 5 The structure of his own model suggests that he has combined components of ontological individualism and the Standard Model in an attempt to encompass the two kinds of social fact.
Epstein's 'grounding and anchoring' model
Epstein proposes a model of social ontology whose central concepts are 'grounding' and 'anchoring'. The grounds of a fact f are the elements of the set {g1, …, gm} of 'more fundamental' facts that provides the 'metaphysical reason that f obtains in the world' (70, 82).
Metaphysical reasons are not causes: roughly speaking, g1, …, gm are what make f the case.
In one of Epstein's examples, f is the fact 'The mob ran down Howe Street'; one of the facts that grounds f is 'Bob, Jane, … and Max ran down Howe Street' (85). A frame principle is a general rule which specifies the grounds for facts of a certain type. Epstein offers the following as an example of a frame principle: 'For all z, the fact "z is a bill printed by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing" grounds the fact that z is a dollar' (79).
The concept of anchoring works at a deeper level: 'For a set of facts to anchor a frame principle is for those facts to be the metaphysical reason that the frame principle is the case'.
In trying to elucidate this concept, Epstein resorts to metaphors that I find opaque. He starts with the already cloudy concept of a 'natural kind' (roughly, a way of categorising things that is supposed to reflect the structure of the natural world). 6 By analogy, he talks about 'social kinds'. He says that a kind needs to be held together by some kind of 'glue'. Natural kinds are glued by 'laws of nature' which make things of the same kind behave in regular ways.
Anchoring principles are what glue social kinds together. There is an ambiguity here, never resolved by Epstein, corresponding with his distinction between the two kinds of social fact. 
But Epstein seems not to notice that this reconstruction edits out the central idea in
Searle's analysis of money. In Searle's 'X counts as Y in C' formula, X refers to pieces of paper with various special features, including that they are issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. What Americans collectively accept is that these pieces of paper are moneythat, by virtue of their function as a medium of exchange, they have value in America (Searle, 1995: 43-51) . In Epstein's reconstruction, Americans collectively accept the much less interesting fact that these pieces of paper are dollars. But, just as the issue of U.S. dollars is governed by institutional rules, so too (presumably) is the issue of Belarusian rubles.
Sufficiently knowledgeable Americans can accept -and, amongst themselves, collectively accept -that pieces of paper that satisfy the Belarusian rules are Belarusian rubles; but that does not make those pieces of paper acceptable in American shops. Notice that this weakness in Epstein's analysis cannot be remedied simply by substituting 'money' for 'dollar'. In that analysis, the fact that some z is a piece of paper issued by the Bureau of Engraving and
Printing metaphysically makes it the case that z is a dollar. But the Bureau of Engraving and Printing cannot metaphysically make it the case that its products are acceptable as a medium of exchange in America.
One might think that, in the case of the dollar bill, the set of more fundamental facts that ground the fact 'z is money' include not only facts about the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, but also facts about what Americans collectively accept. Epstein rejects this thought as revealing the error of 'conjunctivism' -of treating anchors as grounds.
He presents two arguments against this position (120-124). The first is subtle but, I
think, wrong. Suppose I, as a conjunctivist, maintain that what metaphysically makes some piece of paper z money in America is the combination of two facts: (i) that z is issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, and (ii) that Americans collectively accept the rule that the fact that a piece of paper has been issued by the Bureau metaphysically makes the paper money. Epstein's objection is that this claim asserts that Americans collectively accept a false proposition. They collectively accept that (i) is sufficient to ground the fact that z is money but, according to the claim itself, (i) and (ii) Consider the kind of questions that Epstein is asking. In his analysis of money, he takes the case of a dollar-like piece of paper that he has found in his pocket and asks, in effect: Is this really a U.S. dollar? The answer to this question does indeed depend on whether that paper was issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. Epstein is treating this as a microcosm of the question that social ontology should address: 'What are social facts, social objects, and social phenomena -these things that the social sciences aim to model and explain?' The implication is that an economic model of money that is to be applied to the United Sates needs to be based on a true account of what makes a piece of paper a U.S. dollar. But Epstein's question about the piece of paper is not the kind of question that economists typically ask when they theorise about money. Should it be?
As a thought experiment, suppose that the Mafia has developed a method of producing counterfeit twenty-dollar bills that are not detectably different from the products of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. It is circumspect in introducing these bills into circulation. As a result, Mafia bosses enjoy lavish lifestyles but there is only a marginal effect on the total money supply. Are these bills really U.S. dollars? Epstein would say 'No', and that seems to be the right answer. But are they money? I think Epstein has to say that they are not really money. Interestingly, Searle (1995, pp. 32-33) It is an unresolved question in the methodology of economics whether modellers are committed to the claim that their models offer stylized descriptions of certain properties or tendencies of the real world, or merely to the claim that models describe self-contained imaginary worlds that in some respects are similar to the real world. On the first view, espoused for example by Uskali Mäki (1992) and Nancy Cartwright (1998) , the concepts used in an empirically successful model might perhaps be interpreted as 'social kinds' in one of Epstein's senses -as categories that are suitable for use in social science. Such kinds, one might say, are glued together by the empirical tendencies that the model exhibits. But that does not mean that those social kinds were recognised as such, prior to the work of the modeller: the modeller may be discovering previously unrecognised social kinds. On the second view, which has been defended by Ronald Giere (1988) in the context of natural science and by me in relation to economics (Sugden, 2000) , model-building does not take any stand on the ontology of the real world.
I do not want to be read as arguing that social ontology has nothing to contribute to economics. To the contrary, it has made a significant contribution to what I (admittedly as an interested party) believe to be a significant development in economics, the theory of team reasoning. The central idea in this theory is that, in certain kinds of interactions within groups of people, each member of the group understands her own action as a component of the joint action of the group; in choosing how to act, each individual asks 'What should we do?' rather than 'What should I do, given what I expect the others to do?' (Sugden, 1993; Bacharach, 2006) . This approach has generated insights into how players of pure coordination games identify focal points (Bardsley et al., 2010) and into how people might understand the moral status of market transactions (Bruni and Sugden, 2008) . Although the research programme of team reasoning originated in the moral philosophy of act utilitarianism (Hodgson, 1967; Regan, 1980) , it has subsequently cross-fertilized with the literatures of collective intentionality and plural agency (Tuomela and Miller, 1988; Gilbert, 1989; Bratman,1993; Searle, 1995) . Much of the work in the latter literatures has been motivated by ontological questions about the existence and nature of we-attitudes.
As I understand these literatures, however, they are not concerned with the foundations of social science in the same sense that Epstein is. A characteristic feature of philosophical work on collective intentionality and related concepts is the attention it gives to the details of specific kinds of interaction between small groups of individuals. Paradigm cases include two singers of a duet, two people walking together, two people painting a house together, and two players in a soccer team executing a combination of runs and passes.
Perhaps, as Epstein suggests, these accounts of joint action are sometimes 'too idealized and intellectualistic' (255), in something like the way that game theorists' accounts of strategic interaction might be said to be too idealized and rationalistic. Nevertheless, they have provided valuable models of how groups can be considered as agents with intentions and preferences. Good modelling, I submit, requires the modeller to have a clear sense of the concreteness, specificity and credibility of the model world she has constructed, and to find significant similarities between features of that imaginary world and features of the real one (Sugden, 2000) . I believe that this is just as true for ontology as it is for economics.
Epstein seems to favour a different methodology. Referring to models of collective intentionality of the kind that I have described, he says that he does not intend 'to devalue the detailed inquiry into more restrictive cases, such as the small-group paradigm', but (proceeding to devalue it) that we must not lose sight of the fact that 'from just one special sort of realization, we cannot derive a common set of grounding conditions for group agency' (p. 262). Again we see Epstein's aspiration to create an all-encompassing ontology of social facts. He is right to think that the small-group models about which he is so condescending will not provide ontologically-certified building blocks which social scientists will (or should) then put to use. Rather, these models are contributions to the ongoing research programmes of social science. But that, I think, is all to the good.
If social ontology does not provide the foundations for the social sciences, what does?
I commend Otto Neurath's (1937, p. 276) famous metaphor:
We possess no fixed point which may be made the fulcrum for moving the earth; and in like manner we have no absolutely firm ground upon which to establish the sciences. Our actual situation is as if we were on board ship on an open sea and were required to change various parts of the ship during the voyage.
Neurath, as I understand him, is telling us that science has no foundations.
